The 1987 UN General Assembly Resolution on Terrorism is significant both for its forceful condemnation of international terrorism and for the political boundary it drew around that condemnation: it preserved the rights of peoples living under colonial, racist, or foreign occupation to struggle for self-determination and seek support. Noam Chomsky treats the resolution and the opposition it provoked as evidence of a deeper contest over who gets to define terrorism and whose violence international rules constrain.

Adoption and disputed provision

In December 1987, when concern about international terrorism was especially high, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a major resolution condemning the scourge in severe terms and calling on all nations to act vigorously against it. The vote was 153 to two, with one abstention: the United States and Israel voted against, while Honduras abstained.

The contested provision clarified that the resolution could not prejudice the rights to self-determination, freedom, and independence recognized in the United Nations Charter. It addressed peoples forcibly deprived of those rights, particularly those under colonial and racist regimes, foreign occupation, or other forms of colonial domination. It also affirmed their right to struggle to end that deprivation and to seek and accept support, in accordance with the Charter and other principles of international law. The text therefore coupled a broad denunciation of terrorism with a distinction between that condemnation and struggles against coercive rule.

The vote and competing definitions

Chomsky emphasizes that the United States and Israel rejected this recognition of rights; he notes that South Africa, then an ally, had also rejected them. In Washington’s interpretation, the African National Congress was designated a terrorist organization, while South Africa itself was not placed in the same category as Cuba and other states labeled terrorist. The contrast, in his account, shows how the classification could distinguish between violence by an adversary and violence by a state or ally.

He argues that Washington’s interpretation prevailed in practice, with severe human consequences. His point is not simply that the resolution condemned terrorism, but that disagreements over its qualification exposed a problem of consistent application: a definition that isolates the violence of weaker opponents while exempting powerful states and their clients does not operate as a common standard.

Legacy in later counterterrorism debates

Chomsky connects the 1987 vote to later efforts to negotiate a comprehensive convention against terrorism. He describes agreement as difficult because, in his analysis, the United States and its allies would not accept language resembling the disputed provision, even if a definition otherwise followed formulations in the U.S. Code or military manuals. He contends that agreement would be possible only if the concept were reformulated to exempt terrorism committed by powerful states and their clients.

The resolution thus serves as a precedent in Chomsky’s broader argument about law and political power. Its large majority did not settle the meaning of terrorism; instead, the opposing votes and the subsequent difficulty of reaching a comprehensive agreement illustrate how sharply counterterrorism principles can divide when they are applied to allies as well as adversaries. The episode’s enduring significance lies in that unresolved question of equal accountability.